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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PRocEss-FREEDOM OF EXPREsSION-CoMJ.v.IERCE CLAUSE-"GREEN

Rrv1m" ORDINANCE As APPLIED

To DooR TO DooR SoucrrATION FOR MAGAZINE SuBSCRIPTIONs-In

their famous article on the right of privacy, Warren and Brandeis noted
that the common law protection of the right of privacy in the home was
far more highly developed than the protection given to individual
privacy in other respects. "The common law has always recognized a
man's house as his castle, impregnable, often, even to its own officers
engaged in the execution of its commands."1 The common law impregnability has met perhaps its stiffest test when those attacking it ·
have sought constitutional protection. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Breard v. City of Alexandria, La.,2 represents a victory for the forces of impregnability. Breard, a regional representative of a large inter-state magazine subscription agency was convicted of violating an ordinance which prohibited "the going in and
upon private residences in the City of Alexandria, Louisiana by solicitors, peddlers, hawkers . . . not having been requested or invited so to
do by the owner ... of said private residences." 3 Breard attacked the
ordinance on the grounds that it was contrary to the commerce clause,
and that it violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court
of Louisiana4 affirming Breard's conviction. Justice Reed delivered the
majority opinion. Chief Justice Vinson dissented on the commerce

to Privacy," 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 at 220 (1890).
341 U.S. 622, 71 S.Ct. 920 (1951).
3 Ordinance No. 500 of the City of Alexandria.
4 City of Alexandria v. Breard, 217 La. 820, 47 S. (2d) 553 (1950).
1 Warren and Brandeis, "The Right
2 Breard v. City of Alexandria, La.,
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clause question, and Justice Black dissented on the ground that the
due process clause was violated by denial of freedom of expression.
Justice Douglas joined in both dissents. This comment will examine
the grounds of attack.

I. Commerce Clause
A. In general. There have been three principal views of the
degree to which the negative implications of the commerce clause
restrict state regulation where there is no federal legislation in the field.
Very generally, they may be stated as follows: (1) the strict view set
forth by Marshall that interstate commerce is immune from state regulation, except for certain necessary police power regulations;5 (2) the
so-called "Cooley" view, that the constitutionality of a state regulation
should be decided on the basis of a careful weighing of local as against
federal interests in the subject matter of the regulation; 6 and (3) the
"Taney" view, presently espoused by Justice Black, that a nondiscriminatory state regulation of interstate commerce is generally valid until
Congress enacts a law inconsistent with it. 7 The "Cooley" view seemed
firmly entrenched until the recent case of Hood and Sons 11. Dumond,8
in which a New York statute regulating the milk industry was declared
invalid in an opinion which did very little weighing of interests and
gave rise to comments to the effect that. a majority of the Court had
abandoned the "Cooley" approach and was moving in the direction of
Marshall's stricter point of view. 9 The Breard case does little to clarify
the Court's present basic philosophy in this field. While there are overtones of interest-weighing throughout, it comes most to the fore in the
section of the opinion dealing with freedom of the press, rather than in
that devoted to the commerce clause.10 At one point the Court seems
to say that where the regulation is of the conventional police power
type rather than of the economic variety, there will be no weighing at
all, and the Court will look only for a "reasonable basis."11 Certainly
5 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat (22 U.S.) 1 (1824); Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat.
(25 U.S.) 419 (1827).
6 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. (53 U.S.) 299 (1851); Milk Board v. Eisenberg Co., 306 U.S. 669, 59 S.Ct. 773 (1939); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct.
307 (1943).
7 License Cases, 5 How. (46 U.S.) 504 (1847); dissent in Southern Pacific Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 65 S.Ct. 1515 (1945).
s 336 U.S. 525, 69 S.Ct. 657 (1948).
9 47 MicH. L. REv. 1216 (1949); 37 CALIP. L. REv. 667 (1949).
10 341 U.S. 622 at 640, 71 S.Ct. 920 (1951).
11 "When there is a reasonable basis for legislation to protect the social as distinguished
from the economic, welfare of a community, it is not for this court because of the commerce
clause to deny the exercise locally of the sovereign power of Louisiana." 341 U.S. 622 at
640, 71 S.Ct. 920 (1951).
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there is little indication of the tendency toward a stricter Marshall-type
approach which Hood and Sons -v. Dumond1 2 was thought to presage.
There is, in fact, language surprisingly suggestive of the Taney-Black
point of view.13 The fear of a vacuum in the regulation of local affairs,
which is the basis of that approach, seems to receive emphasis.
Two other general aspects of the commerce section of the opinion
are worthy of comment. The first is the concern with "alternatives"both the availability of alternative methods of getting the product to
the consumer,1 4 and the unavailability of alternative means of regulation.15 This concern is more apparent than in previous cases. The
second concerns the practice of looking beyond the face of the statute
into its actual operation for effects discriminatory against interstate
commerce. In his dissent, Chief Justice Vinson expresses a feeling that
the Court is not here following this practice as carefully as it has in
the past.16
B. Door to Door Solicitation. Hawkers and peddlers have long
been subject to the strictest regulation.17 But solicitors for interstate
commerce have been in a protected position because that which they
sell has not yet entered the stock of goods of the state.18 Thus in a long
line of so-called "drummer" cases, starting with Robbins -v. Shelby
County1 9 and reviewed in Nippert -v. Richmond,20 solicitation has been
held exempt from local taxation. There is a certain amount of appeal
to the argument that since taxation of door to door solicitation is an
unreasonable burden on interstate commerce, it follows ipso facto that
flat prohibition must be an even greater and more intolerable burden. 21
Yet any regulation is prohibitory in some degree. When the type of
ordinance with which we are here concerned came before the courts
12 336 U.S. 525, 69 S.Ct. 657 (1949).
13 E.g., "As we said above, the usual methods of seeking business are left open by
the ordinance. That such methods do not produce as much business as house-to-house
canvassing is, constitutionally, immaterial and a matter for adjustment at the local level in
the absence of federal legislation." 341 U.S. 622 at 638 (1951).
14 See note 17 infra.
15 The Court distinguishes Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 71 S.Ct.
295 (1951): "Nor does the clause as to alternatives apply to the Alexandria ordinance.
Interstate commerce itself knocks on the local door. It is only by regulating that knock
that the interests of the home may be protected by public as distinct from private action."
341 U.S. 622 at 636-637 (1951).
16Vinson cites Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 71 S.Ct. 295 (1917); Real
Silk Hosiery Mills v. Portland, 268 U.S. 325 45 S.Ct. 525 (1925); Minnesota v. Barbel\
136 U.S. 313, 10 S.Ct. 862 (1890).
t7Einert v. Missouri, 156 U.S. 296, 15 S.Ct. 367 (1895).
1s Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489, 7 S.Ct. 592 (1887).
19 Ibid.
20 327 U.S. 416, 66 S.Ct. 586 (1946).
21 See note, 18 MINN. L. REv. 475 (1934).
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in the "Green River" cases,22 the point of view was taken that the ordinance did not prohibit solicitation, but merely regulated one aspect of
it-location. When the Green River ordinance was brought before the
Supreme Court, the case was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. 23 In the state courts, "Green River" ordinances have
been upheld in five states, and struck down in eleven, but the latter
cases were for the most part decided on nonfederal grounds.24
The Breard case can be readily distinguished from the "Drummer"
line of cases because it involves a police power, rather than a purely
economic regulation. If the decision represents anything new in the
fields of solicitation and of interstate commerce in general, it is a slight
broadening of the area of police power to protect, to a greater extent
than before, the right of privacy in the home plus a willingness to leave
more to the local legislative discretion in police power cases.

II. Due Process
A. The Right To Carry On a Legitimate Business. The right to
carry on a legitimate business is regarded as a property right and therefore entitled to protection under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.25 Yet, of the grounds urged by Breard for invalidation of the Alexandria ordinance, this was the most tenuous, for it
has long been recognized that such protection is subject to the reasonable exercise of police power by the states. 26 Since "police power," once
restricted to questions of public health, safety, peace, and morals has
come to include matters of general welfare and public convenience,27
and since the feeling has grown that the "reasonableness" of police
power regulation is largely a matter for local legislative determination
as long as there are reasonable bases/ 8 the susceptibility of ordinances
of this type to objection on grounds of deprivation of property without
22 Town of Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., (10th Cir. 1933) 65 F. (2d) 112;
Town of Green River v. Bunger, 50 Wyo. 52, 58 P. (2d) 456 (1936). The Green River
ordinance forbade solicitors, peddlers, etc., to go in or upon private residences without
prior invitation.
23 Bunger v. Green River, 300 U.S. 638, 57 S.Ct. 510 (1937).
24 See Breard v. City of Alexandria, La., 341 U.S. 622 at 628, note 6, 71 S.Ct. 920
(1951).
25 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625 (1923).
2GWilliams v. Arkansas, 217 U.S. 79, 30 S.Ct. 493 (1910).
27£ubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 33 S.Ct. 76 (1912); C.B. & Q. v.
Drainage Commrs., 200 U.S. 561, 26 S.Ct. 341 (1906).
28 Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 51 S.Ct. 522 (1931); Henneford v. Silas
Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 57 S.Ct. 524 (1937); Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U.S. 578,
33 S.Ct. 182 (1913).
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due process has been comparatively slight. The holding of the Court
on this question should come as no surprise.
B. Freedom of Expression. In the past £.fteen years the constitutional protection given to distribution of ideas in printed form from
restrictive municipal ordinances has been considerably expanded. Probably the leading case in this £.eld is Lovell v. Griffin, 29 decided in 1938,
which involved a broadly drawn ordinance forbidding a distribution of
literature of any kind without the permission of the city manager, who
apparently operated with uncontrolled discretion. The ordinance was
held invalid as striking at the very foundation of freedom of the press
by subjecting it to license and censorship. In the next step in the
expansion of this doctrine, the "handbill" cases,30 the interest of the
municipality in preventing molestation of its citizens and in preventing
littering or misuse of its streets was held insufficient to justify the ordinances in question. The ordinance in the "handbill" case most like
the Breard case31 prohibited canvassing and solicitation without a permit, the police chief having discretion to deny the permit where the
applicant was not of good character or was canvassing for a project not
free from fraud. This was thought to have the effect of giving the police
chief powers of censorship with resultant danger of discrimination
against those expressing unpopular ideas. But even without the presence of this element, in Martin v. Struthers,32 the "case that comes
nearest to supporting appellant's contention" in the Breard case,33 an
ordinance forbidding the summoning of home occupants to the door to
receive advertisements was held invalid as applied to an advertisement
for a religious meeting; and in NI.urdock v. Pennsylvania, decided at
the same time, the Court said, "The fact that the ordinance is 'nondiscriminatory' is immaterial-such equality in treatment does not save
the ordinance. Freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position."34
Clearly the protection of the doctrines thus built up should not be
extended to every kind of printed matter. Justice Jackson has expressed
the basic philosophy of the First Amendment thus: "The very purpose
of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming
guardianship of the public mind through regulating the press, speech,
29Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666 (1938).
v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146 (1939). Kim
Young v. California, Snyder v. Milwaukee and Nichols v. Massachusetts were decided at
the same time.
31 Ibid.
32 Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 63 S.Ct. 862 (1943).
33 341 U.S. 622 at 642, 71 S.Ct. 920 (1951).
34 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 at 115, 63 S.Ct. 870 (1943).
30 Schneider
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and religion. In this field every person must be his own watchman for
truth, because the forefathers did not trust any government to separate
the true from the false for us." 35 Thus, freedom of speech and of the
press refers not to self expression on all and sundry matters, but only
on "subjects of general concern,"36 such as political, sociological, religious and economic subjects.87 In the field with which we are here
concerned, the distinction has been drawn in terms of "commercial"
as opposed to "noncommercial" matters.38 One could not bring advertising within the protected area merely by attaching to it a "civic appeal, or a moral platitude."39 On the other hand, merely attaching to
a handbill announcing a religious meeting an appeal to buy a religious
book for a nominal price did not remove it from the protected area; 40
and in Murdock 11. Pennsylvania it was held that "the mere fact that
the religious literature is 'sold' by itinerant preachers rather than 'donated' does not transform evangelism into a commercial enterprise."41
In effect, the question was whether the coIIUp.ercial aspects of a particular undertaking were primary, or merely incidental. But in Martin
11. Struthers the Court seemed to lose sight of the basic philosophy discussed above, and spoke in terms broad enough to include all "literature," excepting only "commercial advertising."42
The actual points decided in these cases, however, dealt only with
the two extremes-literature of a clearly religious nature, and commercial advertising. Things which have commercial aspects, but' are not
simply advertising, pose more difficult problems. The newspaper, of
course, has been regarded as primarily concerned with subjects of gen-·
eral interest and thus entitled to fullest protection.43 The motion picture, on the other hand, has been held to be primarily a medium of
entertainment only. 44 But instead of looking closely into the question
35 Jackson, concurring in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 at 545, 65 S.Ct. 315
(1945).
36 CHAFBB, Frum SP.BECH IN THE UNIT.Bo STATES 31 (1948).
87Resnick, "Freedom of Speech and Commercial Solicitation," 30 CALIF. L. RBv. 655
at 658 (1942).
38 The distinction was referred to in the ''handbill" cases: ''We are not to be taken as
holding that commercial soliciting and canvassing may not be subjected to such regulation
as the ordinance requires." Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 at 165, 60 S.Ct. 146 (1939).
39Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 at 55, 62 S.Ct. 920 (1942).
40 Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 63 S.Ct. 669 (1943).
41 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 at lll, 63 S.Ct. 870 (1943).
42 Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 at 142, 143, 63 S.Ct. 862 (1943).
48 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931); Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444 (1936).
44Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio Industrial Comm., 236 U.S. 230, 35 S.Ct. 387 (1915).
The question was decided in an interpretation of the state, rather than the federal constitution. Even the motion picture, ''The Birth of a Baby'' has been held to come within its
doctrine. American Committee on Maternal Welfare, Inc. v. Cincinnati, ll Ohio Op. 366,
5 Ohio Supp. 425 (1938).
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of how Newsweek and the Saturday Evening Post should be categorized in this respect, the Court in the Breard case contents itself with
saying that the fact that an "element of the commercial" is involved is
sufficient to distinguish the case from Martin v. Struthers,45 and to
make the question merely one of weighing interests as between householders and solicitors. 46 This might be interpreted as signifying that
while a publication is subject to prior restraint47 only if primarily commercial, it is subject to subsequent regulation on the same basis as other
economic activities if it contains only an "element of the commercial."48
At any rate, what amounts to an "element of the commercial" is left
largely in doubt, since there is no intimation that such decisions as
Murdock v. Pennsylvania,49 where there was clearly some "element of
the commercial" involved, are being overruled. Thus the decision may
be criticized for leaving the law in a rather unsettled state. Yet the
writer cannot help sympathizing with the result, for together with other
fairly recent cases,50 it seems to mark the end of a tendency to extend
constitutional protection to anything to which the magic words "freedom of speech" may be attached51 at the expense of other rights, perhaps not so highly publicized, but equally important.52

C. E. Lombardi, Jr., S.Ed.

411 319 U.S. 141, 63 S.Ct. 862 (1943).
46241 U.S. 622 at 642-643 (1951).
47 For a discussion of "prior restraint'' see Ro:crsCHAEFFER, .AMERICAN CoNsTrrU·
'l'.IONAL LAW 758, 759 (1939).
48 But cf. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444 (1936), in
which limitations on circulation were considered prior restraints on publication.
49 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 870 (1943).
50 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 69 S.Ct. 448 (1949); Feiner v. New York, 340
U.S. 315, 71 S.Ct. 303 (1951); comment, 49 MxcH. L. Rllv. 1185 (1951).
51 The comment of Justice Black in his dissent, 341 U.S. 622 at 649-650, to the effect
that the majority has abandoned the "preferred position" doctrine as to First Amendment
liberties does not clarify the meaning and connotations of this doctrine. It is discussed in
49 MxcH. L. Rllv. 1185 at 1192 (1951).
52 "Freedom of the home is as important as freedom of speech." CHAFEB, FREE SPEECH
IN THE UNITED STATES 407 (1948).

